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Abstract 
New technologies are emerging at a fast pace and many of them fail in the beginning. 
Some of new technologies manage to stick around and become more successful. Block-
chain has been around for almost a decade and it has shown great promise in many differ-
ent fields. New technologies create a need for research, as they cannot be blindly trusted 
when not everything is known about them. Research was done on the blockchain technol-
ogy and Ethereum blockchain, focusing on the security aspect. The aim was to find out if a 
blockchain network could be useful in the RGCE Cyber Range as part of research and train-
ing.  
The outcome of the research was a better understanding of the technology behind block-
chain and how secure different parts of it are. To increase readiness and understanding of 
possible attacks, research on different attack vectors on blockchains and Ethereum was 
conducted. Implementing a private Ethereum blockchain in the RGCE Cyber Range will al-
low the JYVSECTEC to research and possibly use the decentralized network in their cyber 
trainings. 
During the research it became clear that even though blockchains are considered very safe 
technology, they have vulnerabilities that need to be considered when using them. A 
blockchain network is safer when compared to traditional centralized networks, but it of-
ten has applications built on top of the network, which pose a risk of potential attacks 
against it. Every part built on top of the blockchain network increases the amount of attack 
vectors. 
Blockchain just as every other technology has its weaknesses but using following best prac-
tices for everyday IT such as password is sufficient for everyday users.  
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Tiivistelmä  
Uusia teknologioita ilmestyy nopealla tahdilla ja monet niistä epäonnistuvat jo alku-
metreillä, mutta jotkin niistä onnistuvat pysymään suosittuina ja menestymään. Lohko-
ketjut ovat olleet olemassa yli 10 vuotta, ja ne ovat näyttäneet kykynsä taipua moneen eri 
käyttötarkoitukseen. Uudet teknologiat luovat tarpeen niiden tutkimiselle, sillä uusiin 
teknologioihin ei voida sokeasti luottaa, kun kaikkea niistä ei vielä tiedetä. Tutkimus lohko-
ketjuista ja Ethereum lohkoketjusta tehtiin keskittyen turvallisuuteen. Tavoite oli selvittää, 
että onko lohkoketjusta hyötyä osana RGCE ympäristöä tutkimusta ja mahdollisesti kyber-
harjoituksia varten. 
Tutkimuksen tuloksena saavutettiin parempi ymmärrys lohkoketju teknologiasta ja sen eri 
osa-alueiden turvallisuudesta. Hyökkäysvektoreiden ja -rajapintojen tutkiminen lisää 
ymmärrystä ja valmiutta hyökkäyksien tapahtuessa. Implementoimalla yksityisen 
Ethereum lohkoketjun RGCE ympäristöön mahdollistetaan JYVSECTEC:in hyödyntävän sitä 
tutkimuksissa ja mahdollisesti kyberharjoituksissa. 
Tutkimuksen aikana selkeni, että vaikka lohkoketjuja pidetään turvallisena teknologiana, 
niin täysin turvallisia ne eivät ole. Lohkoketjujen haavoittuvuudet tulee huomioida niitä 
käyttäessä. Lohkoketju verkko on turvallisempi verrattuna perinteisiin keskittyihin/central-
ized verkkoihin, mutta lohkoketjujen päällä on usein aplikaatioita, jotka lisäävät 
hyökkäysten mahdollisuutta. Jokainen blockchainin päälle lisätty ominaisuus tai aplikaatio 
lisää hyökkäysvektoreita ja joitakin osia voidaan pitää epäturvallisina, jos niiden käyttäjät ja 
kehittäjät eivät ole tietoisia heikkouksista. 
Lohkoketjuilla aivan kuten muillakin teknoloigoilla on omat heikkoutensa, mutta yleisiä tur-
vallisuuskäytäntöjä noudattamalla saadaan mitigoitua suurin osa yleisistä alttiuksista. 
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1 Introduction 
Blockchain and the cryptocurrencies have been gaining popularity, and with that so 
has been scams and attacks against them. Proponents of blockchain consider it to be 
the one of the best ways to create transactions securely (Miles, 2017). Considering a 
technology as the best at anything should always be taken skeptically as technologies 
are constantly evolving and blockchain is no exception. Attacks on wallets and 51% 
attacks on networks are possible and this needs to be considered when using block-
chains. Blockchain technology is also vulnerable to DDoS attacks, even though DDoS 
attacks against a blockchain is harder than attacking a normal network as the work-
load is shared between users of the network. Smart contracts are new and experi-
mental part of blockchain networks, and they can be used in a wide variety of ways 
including DApps. Everything build on top of blockchain is another attack vector for 
hackers and malicious actors. 
1.1 Motivation 
In the rapidly growing and developing environment of technologies it is crucial to 
keep up with new technologies. Cyber security requires keeping up with technologies 
and their weaknesses. Blockchain is a relatively newly adopted technology that has 
been growing in the past years rapidly. Every aspect is still not known about block-
chains and research is ongoing both from the developers and the malicious actors. 
While new technologies emerge, they should be considered and researched from a 
cybersecurity perspective to keep Internet safe. Research and training with new 
technologies is an undisputed necessity. 
The goal of training and research about blockchain is to increase knowledge and pre-
paredness about the possibilities that can occur both beneficial and malicious. Un-
derstanding the technology increases the possibilities it can be used in both research 
and development. Recognizing possible vulnerabilities of different parts of block-
chain is required to effectively being able to prevent attacks and other malicious ac-
tions. By understanding the technology better, the skills to prevent and react to dif-
ferent scenarios with the technology and other parts of it are increased.  
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Implementing a blockchain in an RGCE will enable training and understanding what is 
required to build a decentralized network. Ethereum is the chosen blockchain, as it 
supports private networks, meaning it can be used in a closed environment. Another 
motive to use Ethereum is smart contracts, which have shown great promise with 
trustless transaction contracts. As smart contracts are an experimental part of block-
chains, it requires understanding about the possible vulnerabilities to counteract 
them. Experimental technologies such as smart contracts are updated and developed 
continuously, but so are the attacks on them, as they are still new, not every aspect 
and vulnerability are known about them. 
The blockchain can resist traditional attacks well, but cybercriminals are developing 
new attacks specifically for hacking blockchains and other parts of it. All technology 
has its attack vectors and blockchains are no exception. 
1.2 Research Frame of this work 
Implementing an Ethereum blockchain in the RGCE cyber range platform aims to an-
swer to a question. Will a blockchain network be useful for future research and train-
ing purposes. By implementing a blockchain environment comparable to the real 
blockchain in the Internet can we know if it will be useful or not. After the implemen-
tation research on the security of blockchains will increase knowledge about the pos-
sible weaknesses. Researching blockchain hardening and other mitigations will be the 
secondary purpose of the thesis. 
Priority in the RGCE-network is being realistic, meaning the private Ethereum should 
be used as close as Ethereum in the Internet would be. Other consideration is usabil-
ity, since Ethereum runs as a node it needs to be controlled using various applica-
tions. Without tools, such as wallets that can be used to make accounts and transac-
tions everything would be done from JS command line, each action requiring a new 
command or line of commands. For the research and training purposes the usability 
is very important so researchers and training participants will not have to learn all 
the commands required to use the blockchain, but instead interact with the block-
chain by using an UI. 
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1.3 Research methods 
The research started by reading extensively about different parts of blockchains and 
Ethereum after which research about the security of the blockchains and different at-
tack vectors on Ethereum was conducted. Security and attack vectors were re-
searched and analyzed to understand the vulnerabilities thoroughly. It is important 
to understand the different vulnerabilities of each part of blockchains to use it more 
safely.  
For the implementation, the research included learning about private networks and 
different applications used for the created blockchain environment in the RGCE. 
 
2 Ethereum 
“Ethereum is a decentralized platform that runs smart contracts: applications that 
run exactly as programmed without any possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud or 
third-party interference” (Ethereum). Ethereum was originally proposed at the end of 
2013 by Vitalik Buterin. In 2014 Ethereum collected funding by crowdfunding, and 
the collected money was used for development and publishing of the Ethereum soft-
ware. Ethereum has its own cryptocurrency called Ether or Eth, used for making 
transactions and as a currency.  
Before the Ethereum went live, 60 million Eth was created. 80% of the 60 million Eth 
was available for purchase, and the other 20% was retained for the early contribu-
tors and the developers of Ethereum (EthHub). 
2.1 Technology behind Blockchain 
“Blockchain is a digital ledger of economic transactions that is fully public, continually 
updated by countless users, and considered by many impossible to corrupt” (Carlazo, 
2017). Each block is encrypted by hash of the previous block effectively chaining the 
blocks. Every block has the hash of previous block embedded in the block data, which 
means that blocks can not be edited after they have been made since the hash of 
next block would not match anymore because of the changes made.   
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2.2 Brief History of Blockchain 
Satoshi Nakamoto published a paper about Bitcoin in 2008 and in the following year 
Bitcoin software was published. These events are considered the birth of blockchain. 
Blockchain is not a new invention. Decentralized and cryptographically secured data 
chains and currencies have been proposed before without a proper success. Stuart 
Haber and W. Scott Stornetta published a paper called “How to time-stamp a digital 
document” proposing cryptographically secured chain of data in the year 1991 (Ha-
ber, Stornetta, 1991). They tried to create a system where timestamps of documents 
would become immutable by using the merkle tree design, which is a tree of crypto-
graphic hashing.  Their design also included consensus algorithms to confirm data. In 
Satoshi Nakamoto’s Bitcoin paper, Haber and Stornetta are cited multiple times. 
2.3 Blocks 
Blockchain consists of blocks that have been chained to previous and to the next one 
by using hash from the previous block’s header. Each block contains certain data 
fields, transactions and extra data if needed. (See Figure 1.). 
The genesis block is the first block that begins the chain. Since the first block does 
not have any reference to previous blocks it has to be handwritten and hardcoded in 
the configurations. Genesis block contains the configurations for the blockchain as 
parameters that are in a .json file that can be used to initialize the genesis block.  
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Figure 1 Example of Ethereum block (Etherscan) 
Block Height also known as Block Number, an ordinal number of the current block in-
dicating the length of the blockchain. 
• Timestamp is the time of block being mined in Unix time() format. Time is used for 
calculating mining difficulty, if time between blocks gets too short, the difficulty rises 
and if the time between blocks is too long, the difficulty decreases. 
• Transactions contains all the transaction data and contract internal transactions.   
• Mined by indicates the address and the possible pool of miner who has successfully 
added the block to the blockchain. 
• Block reward is the reward for mining the block. Reward size keeps changing slightly, 
but the basic reward is 2 Eth + fees paid for transactions in the block what amounts 
around 0,01  to 0,2 Eth, depending on the gas spent for transactions. 
• Uncle reward indicates if an uncle block has been mined successfully. Uncle blocks 
happen when two miners generate a block simultaneously and other one gets re-
jected. Uncle block has a significantly lower reward than a normal block. Uncles re-
ward is valid but rejected as it is not on the longest chain which is the working mech-
anism of the blockchain. Uncle block secures the blockchain. (Etherscan).  
• Difficulty indicates the amount of effort required to mine the block. Normally diffi-
culty is automatically calculated from previous blocks difficulty level and timestamp. 
Genesis block does not have previous blocks so the difficulty has to be set manually. 
Generally it is good idea to start with low difficulty, for the first blocks to be mined 
quickly without requiring huge amounts of computational power. 
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• Total difficulty indicates the total difficulty of the chain until the current block. Total 
difficulty is calculated by summing all difficulties of previous blocks. 
• Size indicates the amount of data the block takes. Increasing the gas limit increases 
the block’s size. Average sizes are between 1 000 and 50 000 bytes. 
• Gas used in the block and percentage of gas used in the block and the GasLimit is a 
value that restricts gas usage per transaction. Computational work required to run 
transactions and smart contracts is measured by Gas (Zainuddin). Gas is a small 
amount of Eth comparable of about 0,02€ payed for transferring Eth. Transaction 
maker can pay more Gas to make transaction go faster and going in front of the line 
of transactions. 
• Extra data is any data that the miner of the block can include in the block 
• Hash is the hash of the block header from the current block and parent hash is the 
hash of the previous block. Keccak-256 is the algorithm used for hashing in Ethereum 
blocks to chain them. 
• Sha3Uncles is a hash combined from all uncles before the block. If no uncles are 
found then the Sha3Uncles stays the same. 
• Block Nonce is a 64-bit string hash, which is used for hashing. Essentially it is a value 
used in mining to demonstrate enough work was required to mine the block. 
 
Of these values Genesis block needs timestamp, gaslimit and difficulty to be hard-
coded. In addition, Genesis block also takes additional values and configurations. 
Alloc is a set of two parameters which are used to allocate Eth to specified addresses. 
First parameter is the address Eth is allocated to and the second parameter is 
amount of Eth allocated in Wei, which is the smallest unit of Eth. One Ether equals to 
1e18 Wei. 
Genesis block also contains the configuration for the blockchain network that are 
only in the genesis block. (See Figure 2.) 
ChainID is an integer which is used to identify different blockchain networks, as many 
blockchain networks can be ran at the same time. Main Ethereum ChainID is 1. 
HomesteadBlock is used to specify the version of Ethereum used; 0 = use homestead, 
nil = use old Geth version.  
EIP150Block is used to increase gas price, to prevent DoS-attacks. EIP155Block is used 
to prevent replay attacks. EIP158Block treats empty accounts as non-existent to 
make the data amount of blockchain smaller. EIPs are new features that are used in 
the main network but are optional in the private network. 
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Figure 2 Genesis block file 
 
2.4 Byzantine fault tolerance 
Blockchain networks consists of nodes, which all act on information available for 
them from other nodes. Reaching consensus between nodes is required to include 
transactions into the blocks mined. Problem of reaching consensus is malicious ac-
tors, and the false information they might provide to other nodes. To solve the prob-
lem of malicious node in the pool of regular nodes, modified Byzantine fault toler-
ance is implemented in blockchain in the form of PoW as the consensus algorithm. It 
is used to define failed actions and to reach secure trustless consensus. 
Every decentralized network uses a form of Byzantine fault tolerance. Byzantine fault 
tolerance comes as a solution to problem conceived in 1982 as the Byzantine Gener-
als’ problem. The dilemma assumes that each general has its own army and that 
each group is situated in different locations around the city they intend to attack. The 
generals need to agree on either attacking or retreating. “It does not matter whether 
they attack or retreat, as long as all generals reach consensus, i.e., agree on a com-
mon decision in order to execute it in coordination” (Binance Academy). Byzantine 
fault tolerance uses nodes as “generals” in the problem. 
Each general decides to act separately. Action is to attack or to retreat, or in the con-
text of blockchain yes or no. After decision is made it is final and they can not change 
their decisions. In order for attack or retreat to work perfectly, every general has to 
reach consensus.   
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This works as a base for Byzantine Generals’ problem, but the problem comes when 
generals can only communicate via a message courier. The main problem of this in 
the context of blockchain is when one of the generals says the opposite of what he 
was told or disagrees with others just to cause confusion and possibly failure of oth-
ers. 
Solution to the Byzantine Generals’ problem is simple. If 2/3 or more of the generals 
must agree in order to reach consensus. This also means if 2/3 or more of the gener-
als are corrupt and have chosen to do malicious actions, it will happen, and this is ex-
actly what makes 51% attack possible.   
At the moment Ethereum PoW is the chosen solution to Byzantine generals’ prob-
lem, but later PoS will overtake PoW’s position as it does not consume electricity nor 
require massive amounts of calculating power to use. 
 
2.5 Ethash 
Ethash is the PoW algorithm used in Ethereum which is based on the original Dagger 
Hashimoto mining algorithm. One of the most important things for a good hashing 
algorithm is its ability to resist ASICs. ASIC resistance makes the network more equal 
to miners and it can prevent from 51% attacks. Dagger Hashimoto, which was a pre-
decessor of Ethash was an ASIC resistant algorithm, meaning that the benefits of 
building and developing an ASICs would have been minimal. ASIC resistancy ensures 
that running the algorithm on a normal computer CPU or GPU would still be profita-
ble for the users. Ethereum is traditionally mined using GPUs which are meant to 
render graphics for computers, but they are very efficient at calculating complex 
mathematical problems, such as Ethash.  
Ethereum has been resisting ASIC mining since its starting days, but in 2018 an ASIC 
specifically designed for Ethereum was released. Ethereum specific ASICs are more 
efficient at processing Ethash compared to GPUs. ASIC mining poses a risk of huge 
mining farms controlling a great percentage of Ethereum’s hashrate. There has been 
a race of sorts between ASICS developers and different blockchains, ASICs developers 
create a new machine to circumvent ASIC resiliency and blockchains updates the 
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function to be more ASIC resilient. If a very powerful and efficient ASIC was devel-
oped, it could be used to attack the blockchain.  
A DAG is a large randomly generated dataset used in the Ethash algorithm to make it 
more ASIC resistant (Ethereum GitHub). A new DAG is generated for every epoch, 
which is set of 30 000 blocks.  
In the July of 2020 Ethereum is updating the hashing algorithm with Programmatic 
Proof of Work or ProgPow. The ProgPow fork follows the EIP-1962 update in the June 
of 2020, which contains small changes to the cryptographic functions of Ethereum. 
ProgPow aims to decrease the ASIC advantage over GPUs to a maximum of 20%. Peo-
ple opposing this update might cause a hardfork, meaning that there would be two 
different chains running parallel, one using ProgPow and other using the old PoW al-
gorithm. 
 
2.6 Ether 
Eth is the currency of Ethereum and it is made by mining blocks and before the 
Ethereum main net went live, donators were given some as an exchange for money. 
Mining a block has static 2 Eth reward + fees that were used for transactions in that 
block. A miner that successfully mines the block will get the reward to their account. 
When new block is mined, previously saved data of users is now locked putting them 
in to the block and the Eth is rewarded. In order for users to have Eth as currency 
they need an Ethereum wallet or in Geth an account to store Eth. In addition to the 
wallet’s normal functions, some Ethereum wallets are used to interacting with smart 
contracts and make transactions.  
2.7 Security 
Blockchain is far more less vulnerable compared to traditional networks and storage 
of data. Uneditable ledgers and data distribution across P2P network makes sure that 
data cannot be edited or tampered with.  
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Ethereum just as every other blockchain is considered trustless. Being trustless 
means two entities can securely perform transactions without knowing and trusting 
each other. This is achieved by having a third entity between the two who are doing 
the transaction, to do the transaction and the blockchain does just that. Blockchain 
will always perform the transaction just as it is told to do, with use of PoW. Consen-
sus protocol is a key factor in trustless transactions. Without a consensus protocol, 
anybody could tamper the transaction. 
Even though blockchain networks are considered secure, infrastructure behind the 
blockchain defines the total security. If infrastructure is vulnerable to attacks and ac-
cess, the blockchain can be tampered with and great damage can be done. 
Not only blockchains, but operating systems and and the wallets where the currency 
is stored are attack vectors. Building more functionality on top of the blockchain 
means more attack vectors for malicious actors. 
2.8 Ethereum 2.0 
Major limitation of Ethereum is scalability, Ethereum has shown increased transac-
tion times and higher fees, during high user activity. There is a new version of 
Ethereum being developed by Vitalik Buterin, the writer of the original Ethereum 
whitepaper. He has revealed that Ethereum 2.0 is being developed and first phase 
will be launched in 2020. Ethereum 2.0 will be PoS network, with that also making 
51% attacks more unlikely to happen. 
CASPER is the PoS protocol Ethereum has chosen and is moving towards in the 
Ethereum 2.0. Casper protocol works by validators staking Eth as stake and after that 
they start to validate blocks. Validators discover blocks which they think can be 
added to the blockchain and validation happens by placing a bet on block. If a block is 
added to the chain, the validators get reward based on the bet they have placed on 
the block. Casper is more Byzantine Fault Tolerant and aims to be a trustless system. 
Casper is not a single project, but instead a combination of two projects which are 
worked by the Ethereum development team. The two projects are: Casper Finality 
Gadget, which is a hybrid PoW/PoS consensus meant to ease the transition to purely 
PoS system, and Casper the Friendly GHOST: correct-by-construction.  
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CBC is very abstract concept of building new protocols that are used to build better 
new protocols. New protocols are built by incrementally refining the previous suc-
cessful protocols. 
“It is called correct-by-construction because correctness of new protocols is guaran-
teed by their construction, which is by incrementally defining an abstract (and prova-
bly correct) protocol further” (Asgaonkar, 2018.). 
 
2.9 Smart Contracts 
Smart contracts are essentially software programs that are using blockchain’s distrib-
uted data storage (Praitheeshan, Pan, Yu, Liu & Doss). While originally blockchain 
was mainly used as a ledger or secure way of storing data, the DApp development 
has gaining popularity and smart contracts are the essential part in DApps. Smart 
Contracts are used in applications as autonomous entities acting as the middle man. 
Smart Contracts can be used simply as smart contracts, where they verify the negoti-
ation of a contract without third parties (Rosic 2017). 
DApp is an application that runs on blockchain instead of a computer. DApp is a term 
specifically used for blockchain applications, but there are other decentralized appli-
cations like torrents. Torrents run on a P2P network, instead of blockchain. 
Popular way of comparing DApps to traditional websites or web applications is that 
instead of API there is smart contract and instead of database there is a blockchain. 
Backend is ran from decentralized blockchain network and it works as a database and 
smart contracts are used to run transactions on it. 
 
2.9.1 Smart Contract Usage 
Smart Contracts are mostly used for exchanging anything of value in very easy and 
conflict-free way without having to pay to the middleman. Basically smart contracts 
are protocols of transactions. Smart Contracts are like vending machines, you give 
money and get something in exchange, very straight forward and no need for other 
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entities besides the customer and the machine itself. In terms of Ethereum you an 
give amount of Eth and get service back. 
Smart contracts have terms of agreement, which the transactions rely on. If the 
terms are not met the transaction will not be executed. Terms are written directly 
into the code of smart contract. Smart contracts hold currency to make transactions 
and pay for gas. Currency held by the contract is can vary a lot. More often the con-
tract is used the more currency it needs to complete these transactions. Many smart 
contracts hold significant amounts of Eth, which makes them desirable targets for at-
tackers. 
2.9.2 Solidity 
Smart contracts are written in Solidity. Solidity is an object-oriented, high-level lan-
guage for implementing smart contracts. Smart contracts are programs that control 
the accounts in the blockchain (Solidity). Solidity enables creation of contracts includ-
ing multiple people, such as voting and blind auctions. Solidity is still in beta 0.x ver-
sion, and beta products tend to change a lot. Solidity is updated regularly and that 
can cause old code in contracts to break, but regularly updating the Solidity means 
less bugs and vulnerabilities. 
 
3 Innovative uses of blockchain 
3.1 Usecase: Estonian health records 
In 2016 Estonia was looking for a new more secure ways for securing the health rec-
ords and were looking for new and innovative technologies. During the search multi-
ple cryptocurrency developers and investors were looking big implementations to 
demonstrate the power of blockchain technologies. Securing the health records of 
Estonia by using blockchain was decided on and Estonia became the first country to 
use blockchain as a nation.  
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After concluding on blockchain for securing the health records, Estonian E-Health 
Foundation launched the development for blockchain that would later be known as 
KSI blockchain.  
The KSI blockchain is used to produce an additional layer of security to help maintain 
health record integrity. KSI blockchain is not used to secure the health records di-
rectly, but instead to store files that basically contain data-access logging of the 
health records. By securing the data-access logs with blockchain an unchangeable au-
dit trail is created, auditing said blockchain is proven to be secure as the data cannot 
be changed or tampered with afterwards. 
3.2 Usecase: Internet of Trusted Things 
Internet of Trusted Things is a new term used for IoT integrated with a blockchain. 
According to Dongxing, Wei, Wenping & Fangyu (2018, 6) blockchain is looking to 
solve problems of centralized security models and infrastructures such as DDoS, sin-
gle point failures and scaling infrastructure.  
Generally if IoT is using blockchain, the IoT devices work as nodes connected to the 
blockchain network. Blockchain can be used as the database for IoT network, but as 
the network grows, so does the data that has to be processed, more data requires 
more computing power which makes scaling a problem for IoT devices. As the strong 
cryptographic algorithms produce latency, and latencies are not suitable for real time 
IoT devices. 
Most promising feature for blockchain to fix in the IoT field is the authentication. 
Identity authentication system for IoT devices is dependant on a CA server, which is 
at risk of single-point-failure attack (Dongxing, Wei, Wenping & Fangyu, 2018, 2). 
In the undregulated IoT market, the security of devices is a problem that enables de-
vice hacking (Compton, 2017). IoT is at risk of hacking as much as any other com-
puter which is poorly protected if using insecure components or outdated software. 
One of the biggest problems with blockchain in the IoT devices is the power required 
to run PoW mining. Devices need to be powerful enough to process the blockchain 
actions and even if they are powerful enough, the 51% attack is still an attack vector. 
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Protection against 51% and less power consuming more efficient PoW or PoS algo-
rithms need to be developed to secure the IoT market and to make blockchain more 
viable part of IoT. 
 
3.3 Usecase: RGCE 
Platform for the Ethereum blockchain is  RGCE (Realistic Global Cyber Environment). 
RGCE is owned and ran by JYVSECTEC at Jyväskylän ammattikorkeakoulu in Jyväskylä. 
RGCE is multipurpose environment for cyber security training and exercises.  RGCE is 
used as a realistic cyber environment, meaning it is built to perform like Internet, real 
machines, traffic and applications would. RGCE is used for research and develop-
ment, and for training public authorities. 
Geth provides a real Ethereum network, that works basically same as the main net-
work. It is run as private network, meaning it can be controlled and altered by 
JYVSECTEC engineers. It can be used to create more depth in the realistic environ-
ment and allow people interact with blockchain as they would in the Internet. 
Ethereum could be used for ransomware campaigns, as means of paying the mali-
cious actor in a campaigns or as asset of blue team, which could be attacked. Smart 
contracts can be implemented for training or research for smart contract based at-
tacks. Smart contracts also enable developing DApps for the environment, if they are 
seen as a beneficial part of training and research. 
 
4 Implementation 
Implementation from empty machine to run blockchain,  either an Internet connec-
tion must be established, or the needed repositories have to be downloaded in to 
the private network prehand. The blockchain is run as a decentralized network, 
meaning after everything required to run the blockchain by starting the Geth, the 
connection to the Internet may be cut completely. Geth supports private networks 
and they do not require Internet connection to be run. Although Internet is not 
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needed to build a blockchain network, a working connection between nodes have to 
be established in order to transfer data i.e. local network. All the data is moving in 
the private decentralized network created by the blockchain software. 
4.1 Go-Ethereum 
Geth is the official implementation of the Ethereum used to implement the block-
chain and create private blockchain network. Implementation platform of choosing is 
Ubuntu, but Geth can be run from Windows, most common Linux distributions and 
MacOS. Installation manual for Geth is found in Appendix 1. 
As one of the goals of this thesis is to make Ethereum as easy to use as possible, 
avoiding the need to use JS command line is important for the ease of usage. Geth 
can be used as a standalone Ethereum platform. Everything can be done from JS 
command line but using a wallet application makes the using and accessing the 
blockchain much easier. Used applications allow using and monitoring the blockchain 
take a lot less effort. For usage in cyber security training the applications are essen-
tial, so the participants do not have to learn how to use Geth from JS command line. 
Using applications with graphical interface is more intuitive and in most cases more 
realistic.   
Ethereum mining can be done in the background from one or couple of computers 
doing all the mining needed. Ease of mining has been taken into consideration and it 
does not require any notable amounts of energy or computing power to mine blocks 
when difficulty is set to a low value.  
4.2 Installation 
Installing private blockchain in to the RGCE cyber range is done as it would be done 
on regular computer connected to the Internet as the blockchain does not connect to 
the Internet, but instead creates a decentralized network itself. The Geth is installed 
and running in every computer joining to the blockchain network. 
Geth can be run as light node, which does not require to download the whole block-
chain, but for the purposes of RGCE running full nodes is suggested at least in the 
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case of running a small network. If creating a realistic large, more difficult, and 
slower blockchain some of the nodes may be ran as light nodes, meaning they use 
light sync. Light sync only downloads block headers, instead of the whole blockchain. 
In the actual Ethereum network the blockchain takes a lot of diskspace if ran as a full 
node, but light node only requires couple hundred MB of memory, and the syncing to 
the main net is more efficient and faster compared to full node. 
To start the network one node is used as the bootnode, meaning it is used to start 
the blockchain and every other node connects to it as peers. Running a boot node 
makes monitoring of the blockchain and nodes far less complicated, as everything is 
connected to one central point. Parallel blockchain networks can be run as simply as 
using different network IDs and different RPC addresses and ports.  
After the Geth is installed it is used from the terminal using the “Geth” command. 
Using Geth requires the genesis block to be written in .json format file. After the gen-
esis file is written the Geth can be started for the first time.  
 
Figure 3 Starting the Ethereum blockchain 
Executing the command to start Geth starts the blockchain and it is up and running, 
but not ready for use. (See Figure 3.) 
4.3 Creating users 
User accounts are used for storing Eth and identifying nodes in the blockchain net-
work. One node may have many accounts, for different purposes and nodes are not 
bound to a singular address. User addresses are unique 42-byte long hex strings and 
built by applying Keccak-256 hash function to user’s public key, which is automati-
cally generated.  
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After starting the Geth for the first time, first action should be an account creation to 
be used as the coinbase. (See Figure 4.) Coinbase is used as a wallet for miner to save 
the Eth rewards gained from mining blocks. Coinbase is a normal account, meaning 
transactions can be made from and to it and it can be used for smart contracts. With-
out a coinbase mining is impossible, as every block successfully mined rewards Eth, 
and it has to go somewhere. Coinbase can also be imported from Metamask or any 
other wallet that supports exporting accounts. Importing account from Metamask al-
lows the miner to see and use the rewarded Eth easily from Metamask directly. After 
the coinbase account is made, allocating Eth to it in the genesis block file is possible 
simply by including the account address under the alloc flag and removing the exist-
ing blockchain followed by re-initializing the genesis block. This is especially useful in 
case of cyber security training, as the participants of training can have an account 
ready, that has a set sum of Eth already allocated to it.  
Guide for joining the blockchain from other nodes can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
Figure 4 Creating a coinbase account in Geth 
4.4 Metamask 
Metamask is a browser extension that acts as an bridge between user and 
blockchain. It is used as a external wallet and making interactions with the Metamask 
is much more simplified compared to JS-command-line. Metamask runs as normal 
node and enables account creation, so end user does not have to use Geth JS-
commands to create accounts and create transactions. Only downside of using 
Metamask in the test environment is that it can not be used for mining. However this 
has been taken into account and difficulty is set low in the blockchain, meaning only 
one node can be mining, and the blockchain still runs fast without any problems. Low 
difficulty means that there will be more blocks requiring more space, but in the case 
of private environment, the blockchain can always be completely removed after its 
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usage, if not more needed. Even though the blocks are generated fast, they do not 
contain as much data as a real block would in the main net, meaning the block size 
should not become a problem. Installation manual for Metamask can be found in 
Appendix 2. 
After the coinbase account is made, no further accounts are needed to be made on 
the JS-command-line, but instead they are made using the Metamask. 
 
Figure 5 Metamask interface 
Metamask interface is very simple and intuitive, thus not requiring practically any 
learning to use. (See Figure 5.) Metamask can create accounts and perform transac-
tions. Accounts made in Metamask have 0 Eth just as in new accounts in the normal 
Ethereum blockchain would. Allocating Ether to Metamask accounts is possible, even 
though the blockchain needs to be removed, the Metamask account will still work. 
Removing the blockchain will remove the currency from both Metamask and Geth 
users. 
4.5 Monitoring 
Monitor is run from bootnode, and it can be run in localhost or it can be hosted to 
other networks. Monitor offers live time statistics of the blockchain running which is 
it connected to. Installation manual for monitoring is found in Appendix 3. 
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The monitoring is done using Eth-net-intelligence-api, which is the back-end part of 
monitor. It gets information from the blockchain by using JSON-RPC to get data 
straight from the node it is running on. 
Eth-netstats is the front-end part of the monitor which gets information from eth-
net-intelligence-api and transforms the data into a graphic form, which is easier to 
access and read. Eth-netstats gets data from eth-net-intelligence-api through the 
WebSockets protocol and outputs them through an angular interface.  
 
Figure 6 Monitoring application accessed from the browser 
 
The monitoring tool shows the current block, uncle blocks, last block and time 
elapsed from the mining of the latest block, average block mining time, average net-
work hashrate, difficulty and nodes connected to the monitor. (See Figure 6.) 
The monitoring tool is especially useful for analyzing the network, if blocks are mined 
slowly or the hashrate is dropping then something is going wrong or a miner might 
have stopped. Monitoring singular nodes is possible, making it easier to spot if nodes 
are not connected if they are supposed to be, or if nodes are experiencing problems 
with mining or interacting with the network. 
4.6 Smart Contracts 
Remix-IDE is an IDE for smart contract development. Remix-IDE is used on the ma-
chines that are using smart contracts. Remix-IDE uses Solidity as the language and it 
is able to connect to private networks. Normally Remix-IDE is used from browser 
connecting to the hosted service, but in RGCE environment a self hosted local version 
of Remix-IDE, which is connected to the private Geth network is used.  
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Implementing Remix-IDE in to RGCE allows development of smart contracts and 
DApps if they are needed for training or research purposes. To implement a smart 
contract a file needs to be made in the Remix-IDE file explorer which has “.sol” file-
name extension. After smart contract is written it can be compiled and ran, as long as 
a machine is mining on the blockchain to lock the contract transactions to blocks. 
Running smart contracts also require small amount of Eth, to pay for gas fees.  
To test that Remix-IDE is working properly, a simple “hello world” script was used for 
testing. After writing and compiling the smart contract it was deployed. After a con-
tract is deployed it can be seen in the deployed contracts section, and by opening 
and rendering the deployed contract output of the contract a string “helloWorld” can 
be seen. (See Figure 7.) Installation manual for Remix-IDE can be found in Appendix 
5. 
 
Figure 7 Hello world test 
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5 Attack vectors for blockchain and malicious use of 
blockchain 
Blockchains are resistant to traditional attacks, but cybercriminals are developing 
new attacks and finding new attack vectors. Not only the blockchain network is at 
risk of attack, but so are the other parts built on top of the blockchain.  
5.1 51% attack 
Blockchain as a technology is considered very secure and hard to attack. The most 
probable attack on the blockchain network is the 51% attack. This type of attack is 
more likely to happen on smaller blockchain networks that do not have as much hash 
power as the major blockchains.  If one entity manages to control over half of the 
network’s hashrate, they can double spend. Double spending occurs, when a mali-
cious entity who is performing the attack mines another chain forking from the cor-
rect chain. The attacker proceeds to stealth mine isolated chain while not broadcast-
ing it to the rest of nodes connected to the main chain. Other nodes continue to 
mine and act with the blockchain, without knowing the malicious isolated chain is be-
ing mined. Attackers might be able to block some, or all transactions being con-
firmed, since on blockchain networks the majority has to approve transactions for 
them to happen. Blocking mining is also possible on some blockchains and it is known 
as mining monopoly. 
The lifecycle of 51% attack. Attacker can spend all his currency on the actual chain 
knowing he will not actually lose any currency. The spending happens in the “Block 
52” in this example. (See Figure 8.) 
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Figure 8 Stealth Mining 
 
Figure 9 Continuing Stealth mining 
This is where the attacker needs more hashing power compared to the rest of the 
network combined. (See Figure 9.) After the attacker’s currency is spent, attacker 
then needs to race and finally overtake the original chain by mining ahead of the cor-
rect chain. (See Figure 10.) 
 
Figure 10 Racing the original chain 
After the attacker catcher and gets ahead of the original chain the stealth mining is 
over and the fork will be broadcasted to the rest of the network. (See Figure 11.) 
 
Figure 11 Broadcasting the malicious fork 
Due to how blockchains work, the longest and “heaviest” chain is considered the 
right one. Rest of the network will join the corrupt chain and consider it the correct 
one. (See Figure 12.) 
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Figure 12 Network joining the corrupt chain 
The corrupted blockchain is now considered the correct blockchain, and all the trans-
actions that happened in the other chain after the stealth fork was made, will be re-
versed. Other people might lose or win when this happens, but reversing transac-
tions is considered very dangerous since real money can be spent to buy currency, 
and suddenly they will not have the currency they bought. The attacker gains all the 
money spent on the previous chain back and the transaction made still stands in the 
old chain. 
5.2 Sybil attack 
Controlling multiple or a majority of the nodes on the network as a malicious actor 
enables manipulating the network. The attacker can outvote honest votes and even 
block transactions and even block other users from the network. In a large scale Sybil 
attack, the malicious actor might control over half of the hashing power of the net-
work and perform a 51% attack. 
A Sybil attack happens when one malicious actor controls a large number of the 
nodes in the network. Victim gets surrounded by attacking nodes and the attacker 
can then block transactions of the victim and possibly to double-spending attacks. 
(See Figure 13.)A Sybil attack is difficult to detect and prevent, but actions can be 
taken to prevent this type of attack happening. Using user power-based reputation 
or some other type of trust system for joining the network can be used as a solution 
to prevent the attack from happening  
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Figure 13 Sybil attack illustrated 
5.3 DDoS 
A Distributed Denial of Service attack is a common attack on centralized networks, 
but blockchains are effectively resistant to DDoS. Theoretically a blockchain network 
can be DDoS’ed, but in reality that would take such an immense amount of data and 
attackers, that it can be considered not a threat. Blockchains are effective protecting 
against DDoS attacks, as the workload is distributed to all nodes in the network. In 
blockchain networks the nodes may be pooled which allows larger amounts of data 
to be processed if DDoS is attempted on the network. Resilience against DDoS 
depends on the hash rate and size of the network. In larger network it does not 
cause problems if couple of nodes get disconnected from the network due to an 
attack. 
5.4 Eclipse attack 
An Eclipse attack is kind of a man in the middle attack where the attacker gets be-
tween the victim and the blockchain network. Performing such an attack requires 
large amount of IP addresses or botnet to overwrite victim nodes tried table. Each 
node has a table containing 4096 IP addresses of nodes that it has not connected to 
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yet. When the victim node is restarted, connections made by the victim are redi-
rected to the attackers IP addresses. The victim node will be unable to interact with 
the network because it is connected to malicious nodes. Ethereum has patched 
eclipse attack and Ethereum networks are not vulnerable to eclipse attacks anymore.  
5.5 Non blockchain specific attacks 
Attacks exist specifically against blockchain networks and other parts of it, but other 
common attacks against centralized networks and applications do still apply to some 
parts of the blockchain and the environment around it. 
5.5.1 Phishing 
In 2018 IOTA blockchain had its wallets attacked with phishing. Attackers used fake 
seed generator, that allowed them to steal ~4 million USD worth of IOTA from the 
victims that had fallen to phishing.  
Other blockchain wallets are no exception and phishing campaigns can still happen. 
Phishing attacks have been gaining popularity and cryptowallets and coin exchanges 
are phished regularly. 
In the May of 2019 hackers managed to steal 41 million USD worth of Bitcoin from 
the Binance coin exchange. Hackers used variety of attack vectors such as phishing 
and viruses. In this attack no user lost any Bitcoin, as Binance had implemented a Se-
cure Asset Fund for Users, for specifically these kinds of situations. 
5.5.2 Dictionary Attacks 
Passwords are only as strong as the user sets them. Weak and common passwords 
are being used and attackers are taking advantage of this. Wallets, computer, coin 
exchanges and even blockchain accounts all have passwords that are commonly 
stored in form of cryptographic hash. Attackers attempt to use common passwords 
and hash them to break the victims’ hash and salt. 
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5.6 Smart Contract Attacks 
DApps and smart contracts running on blockchain, are not nearly as secure as the 
blockchain itself. Smart contracts are essentially code powered by blockchain, mak-
ing it as vulnerable as normal code. Coders of smart contracts need to take security 
into account when developing smart contracts and DApps. Transactions to DApps are 
ran through the blockchain network. Transactions are first relayed around the block-
chain network until a miner puts the transaction in to a block (Eskendari,  Mosaavi & 
Clark, 1). 
For the scripting nature of Solidity, which the smart contracts are written in, many 
less severe vulnerabilities are discovered constantly.  
5.6.1 Reentrancy 
Reentrancy attacks have the greatest potential to cause harm. They can drain Eth out 
of smart contracts or even break the code. Reentrancy attack is possible when a 
smart contract contains function call to an external contract for its execution.  If the 
malicious actor controls the external contract, they can repeat interactions that 
should not happen after the initial execution. For example a contract that does ac-
counting, might expose a variable that shows how much balance the contract holds. 
If the contract doesn’t set its balance to zero before sending Eth to recipient, the ma-
licious recipient can write code that has fallback which calls withdraw repeatedly be-
fore the contract sets its balance to zero causing the contract to lose all balance it is 
holding. 
5.6.2 Front-running 
Front-running is an attack where a malicious node observes a transaction after it is 
broadcast but before it is finalized, and attempts to have its own transaction con-
firmed before or instead of the observed transaction (Eskendari, Mosaavi & Clark, 1). 
All transactions are visible in the network for a short period of time before they are 
locked into a block, which creates an opportunity of malicious actions. There are 
three kinds of front-running attacks. 
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Displacement is an attack, where the malicious actor sees transaction and proceeds 
to do the same transaction but with higher gas price. Attacker could see someone 
buying something and getting to buy it before the original buyer’s transaction goes 
through. 
An insertion attack is exactly how it sounds. Someone places a transaction on an as-
set at a higher than asking price. A malicious actor sees the transaction and buys the 
asset for the asking price and then inserts the same asset as an offer for the higher 
price. Then the original buyer gets the asset, but the malicious actor has made a 
profit. This is done by outbidding the original buyers gas price. 
Suppression attack also known as a block stuffing attack happens when a malicious 
actor delays the transaction from happening. The malicious actor can increase the 
gas price and gas limit, to use all the available gas limit, thus delaying the original 
transaction from happening. 
Front running attacks are caused by bad smart contract code and they can be solved 
by following good known practices. 
5.6.3 Integer Overflow and Underflow 
Solidity has integer types that have set maximum values, such as “uint8” = 255, 
“uint161” = 65535. Integer overflow and underflow may occur when the maximum 
or minimum values are exceeded. OpenZeppelin SafeMath library is suggested to be 
used when performing mathematical operations in smart contracts. The library is 
used to check for overflows. 
5.6.4 DoS with block gas limit 
Ethereum blocks have a gas limit, and if the gas limit of a block is exceeded, the 
transaction will not be accepted and will fail. This opens the way for attackers to at-
tack in two different ways. 
Unbounded operations may happen intentionally or by accident when creating trans-
action to an array of recipients. The gas limit might be exceeded without even trying. 
Malicious actor can take advantage of this by creating a massive array of recipients 
and sending minimal amounts of Eth using a smart contract, which can cause the 
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smart contract to not be able to process any other transactions. Attacker can also 
use multiple addresses to make small transactions using the smart contract. If the 
smart contract has a fallback function that refunds the Eth sent to it, but the gas cost 
of refund exceeds the gas limit the transaction will fail causing a DoS. To prevent this 
from happening each payment could be separated to individual transactions in the 
code. 
Block stuffing DoS is more targeted attack as it is more effective at blocking transac-
tions. Attacker can prevent other transactions by placing computationally intensive 
transactions with high gas price. Making multiple of transactions consuming the gas 
limit with high gas price will be included in the next block before the other transac-
tions go through. This attack can be effective on time sensitive actions, when some-
thing needs to be done at specific time to get an advantage, the attacker can make 
the action and block all subsequent transactions. It is not 100% certain the attacker 
as no gas price can guarantee the next block for the intended transaction, but higher 
gas price increases chances of succeeding. This attack is only profitable when the 
profits of a successful attack exceeds the cost of the attack.  
5.7 Ransomware 
Ransomware criminals encrypt their victim’s data, making their systems useless and 
data unavailable. The attackers are demanding a ransom, usually a sum of Bitcoin or 
other cryptocurrency. Often ransomware attackers use blockchain in ransomware at-
tacks, as the payment method for decrypting data. Criminals like to use cryptocurren-
cies as it is easy to write software that asks for users to send cryptocurrency and in 
some cases performs the decryption of data when amount of currency is sent to the 
address.  
In 2018, the HC7 Planetary ransomware was the first ransomware attack, where the 
attacker accepted Eth as payment for decrypting data. In addition to Ethereum the 
ransomware also accepted Bitcoin and Monero. 
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6 Hardening and mitigations 
Blockchain and Ethereum are both considered safe in the eyes of the public, but ma-
licious actors are finding more ways to break different parts of blockchain. Simply by 
following general good practices for cyber security such as keeping Go-Ethereum up 
to date, many of the known vulnerabilities can be prevented. Some safety precau-
tions are in order when setting up an Ethereum network, especially if the blockchain 
is open to join from the outside of LAN. 
6.1 Common Practices 
Easy steps of hardening include very basic steps including using a strong password 
for accounts as well as using a firewall like UFW. The next step would be using re-
verse proxy such as Nginx and using HTTP basic auth.  
RPC is not password protected for users and using a HTTP basic Auth will reduce the 
chances of RPC getting attacked by adding an additional layer of security by requiring 
username and password to access RPC. With a reverse proxy, IP whitelisting is a great 
way to prevent RPC access from unwanted IP spaces.  
People are considered be the weakest link in the security. Human error and bad prac-
tices are the most common attack vectors. Phishing attacks have happened to 
Ethereum wallets and the best way to prevent phishing and other tricks to get ac-
cess, is increasing knowledge and to train people. Good practice is to keep people 
well educated about secure computing practices, such as strong passwords, protect-
ing computer, not installing any files from Internet and not leaving computer open or 
accessible. 
 
6.2 51% attack 
Fully protecting a blockchain from 51% attack is a nearly impossibile but making the 
attack far less feasible can be achieved. Efforts are made to get rid of the attack, but 
it is common in blockchains. Most promising of 51% attack mitigations are a form of 
increasing the cost of an attack so much that it won’t be profitable. As the attacker 
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would need to invest so much resources and money into the attack the attacker 
would essentially invest in the blockchain. Attacking the blockchain could crash the 
value of the currency of the blockchain and this effectively turns the attack cause a 
loss instead of a profit. 
Researchers at the University of Luxembourg are part of an international team that 
has proposed the first blockchain system to guarantee proper performance even 
when more than 51% of the system's computing power is controlled by an attacker. 
The proposed idea is a reputation system that requires long term commitment of 
honest mining over long periods of time, effectively making 51% attack so expensive 
for the attacker that the attack would end up with loss instead of profit. 
When Ethereum 2.0 will be launched, the 51% attack will be unlikely to happen any-
more. 51% attacking a PoS network is more disadvantageous for the attacker, be-
cause the attack would need to require 51% of the currency to be held by the at-
tacker. By holding 51% of the currency in the network the attacker would harm him-
self by attacking against the network he is the major shareholder of. If attacker suc-
cessfully performs an 51% attack on PoS network, the attacker himself would suffer 
the biggest as the value of the currency would crash down after a network wide at-
tack, thus making the currency held by the attacker lower in value. 
Horizen has proposed a modified Satoshi consensus that implements a system that 
punishes for mining forks and delays the publishing of that fork. Implementing a de-
lay to accept forks, can mitigate a 51% attack by requiring the attacker to mine much 
more, which causes the attack to not be economically profitable anymore. Penalty 
system of Horizen works following: Attacker disconnect from main net and starts to 
mine a fork.  If attacker starts mining from block 100 and mines to block 119 but the 
main net is only at block 116, trying to publish the fraudulent fork as main chain, the 
system gives attacker penalty points for each block overwritten. In this case the at-
tacker is trying to overwrite 16 blocks from 100 to 116, the system gives 16 penalty 
points. Attacker then must mine 16 blocks to get 1 penalty point off, followed by 15 
blocks and so on. In total attacker needs to mine 133 blocks on top of the original 16 
blocks he has already mined.  
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Using Bitcoin as an example for Horizen penalty system, the average block time is 10 
minutes. This means that an attacker with 51% of calculating power takes ~20 
minutes to mine a block and mining 133 blocks would take 2660 minutes, which is 
880 hours meaning over a month of mining. Mining this long with the required 
amount of power would cost an immense amounts and the profitability would be 
non-existent.  
 
6.3 Smart Contracts 
Ethereum and blockchain programs are still quite new and experimental. New vul-
nerabilities known to public are patched by Solidity, but the major part of security 
lies in the hands of the writer of smart contract.  
Consensys has written extensively on the topic of Ethereum smart contract security 
and best practices on their website (Consensys). General philosophy contains infor-
mation about the mindset required to write secure smart contracts, general tips and 
what to expect when writing smart contracts. Smart contract recommendations 
demonstrate secure patterns of smart contracts that should be used when writing 
smart contracts. Best way securing smart contracts is gaining knowledge about possi-
ble attacks, attack mitigations and following the best practices.  
 
7 Future development 
7.1 Moving to PoS 
When Ethereum 2.0 is published, the old Ethereum blockchain should be replaced by 
new PoS version. PoS requires less mining power, which makes running it in bigger 
scale easier. PoS increases the security of the blockchain network and makes 51% far 
less profitable for attackers.  
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7.2 Quantum computing 
When quantum computers become a reality, they might be able to break public key 
encryption (Chattopadhyay 2017). While quantum computers are coming in the fu-
ture, they are not stable enough yet and it might be over a decade before they be-
come a reality concerning everyday computing. If blockchain continues to rely on 
public-key cryptography, quantum computing will eventually break the blockchain. 
Quantum resilience should be a consideration for developers of blockchains. NSA has 
revealed it is working on “quantum-resistant crypto” and Andreas Antonopoulos who 
is a Bitcoin advocate has said that we should be ready for quantum computing when 
it breaks the elliptic curve. 
8 Conclusions 
While blockchain is still relatively new and upcoming technology, the hype around it 
has calmed down. While the hype is not as big as it used to be, blockchain is still in 
fast development, maybe waiting for something great to happen or to be developed 
for the breakthrough to the public. More blockchains are developed constantly all of 
which providing something the one before has not provided yet. Increased levels of 
building on top of the blockchain causes increased amount of attack vectors and this 
needs to be taken into account when using and developing them, especially in busi-
ness.  
Blockchain has been implemented in various ways into many different applications, 
but it has not found a practical use that will be widely used. Only when blockchain 
breakthrough happens and someone figures out an exceptional way to use it or how 
to merge blockchain into some other technology can we know the limits and possibil-
ities of blockchain. It is impossible to predict the future, but the blockchain poses a 
great promise and possibilities. 
Maybe the greatest potential of blockchain is in the security of the blockchain. While 
blockchain is considered very safe and nonpermutable, parts of it are susceptible to 
attacks. Especially smart contracts have many ways to break the code and cause 
harm. 
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While a 51% attack is the greatest risk for blockchain networks, the future for devel-
opment has shown great potential to make the risk of 51% attacks less probable. 
Even completely 51% attack resistant blockchains have been proposed, but by defini-
tion blockchains are susceptible to 51% attacks no matter PoW or PoS. 
Ethereum is kept up to date and the developers are actively making it more secure 
technology in all areas. The greatest concern of security lies in the DApps and smart 
contracts. Developing DApps or using smart contracts are still in the early stages and 
all the attack vectors might not have surfaced yet. Just as in normal app development 
security must be a major consideration from the start to the production. 
Blockchains are still mostly used for the cryptocurrencies. An average user uses wal-
let to interact with the blockchain or coinexchange. For this kind of user, a strong 
password or buying a hardware wallet are the only options for securing their crypto-
currencies.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1.  Installation manual for Go-Ethereum 
Geth is run on Ubuntu 16.04, but other Linux distributions and Windows machine can 
be used. 
A directory must be created for blockchain datadirectory. Installing Geth can be done 
using following commands: 
• sudo apt-get install software-properties-common 
• sudo add-apt-repository -y ppa:ethereum/ethereum 
• sudo apt-get update 
• sudo apt-get install ethereum -y 
 
After successfully installing Geth it can be started for making a coinbase account, 
which is required for mining. For starting of Geth following command is used: 
• sudo geth console 2>log.log 
 
After Geth is started a JS console is used to create an account, which will be automat-
ically used as the coinbase. Coinbase is set and Geth can be closed using following 
commands: 
• personal.newAccount() 
• Exit 
 
Geth has been started once and before using it a configuration file for genesis block 
needs to be made. Coinbase account can be used in the genesis block for allocating 
Ether. (See Figure 2.) Genesis block needs to be initialized, but as the blockchain has 
started once, a database has been established and it needs to be removed, before 
the genesis block can be initialized by using following commands: 
• sudo geth –nousb –datadir /pathname/directory_used_for_go-ethereum removedb 
• sudo geth –nousb init /pathname_where_genesis_file_is_located/genesis.json –
datadir /pathname/datadirectory_for_go-ethereum 
 
Now Geth can be started properly. (See Figure 3.) Starting go-ethereum is done using 
following command: 
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• sudo geth –identity “name” –datadir /pathname/directory_of_go-ethereum –net-
workid 123 –nousb –rpc –rpcport “8545” –rpcaddr “localhost” –rpccorsdomain “*” –
rpcapi “db, eth, net, web3, miner” console 2>log.log 
 
Starting commands explained: 
• Identity is the custom name for the node.  
• Datadir points to the directory for databases and keystores.  
• NetworkID is custom integer which is used to identify network.  
• NoUSB disables monitoring for usb wallets. If not used, may prompt error when run.  
• RPC enables HTTP-RPC server. RPC is used for external tools to manage and observe 
the blockchain.  
• RPCport defines the port used for RPC, default port is 8545.  
• RPCaddr points to RPC listening interface, default localhost.  
• RPCcorsdomain list of domains to allow cross origin requests, “*” means allow all.  
• RPCapi list of API’s used for RPC.  
• Console starts a JS console.  
• 2>log.log saves the output of the Geth to log.log file.  
 
Blockchain will start and if machine is a mining machine the mining can be started us-
ing the command: 
• miner.start(number_of_threads_used_for_mining) 
 
Difficulty of the blockchain should be set low in the blockchain file’s “difficulty” pa-
rameter, so only one machine can do the mining work for the whole blockchain. Min-
ing will not start immediately as a DAG must be generated, which can take couple of 
minutes. To follow the progression of DAG generation and mining, “tail” can be used 
to view the log file in real time: 
• tail -f “logfile.extension” 
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Appendix 2.  Installation manual for Metamask 
Metamask is installed from the browser extension store. After Metamask is installed 
to the browser, an account is automatically created, and additional accounts can be 
created simply by using the wallet interface’s “create account”.  
Metamask is connected to the private blockchain, by using the network selection in 
the extension. (See Figure 14.) If blockchain is run on localhost and in default RPC-
port the “Localhost 8545” can be selected and Metamask will connect to the block-
chain. If the blockchain is hosted to a network and is using different RPC-port, the 
“Custom RPC” selection enables the configuration for custom address and port used. 
(See Figure 15.) 
 
Figure 14 Metamask network selection 
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Figure 15 Custom RPC configuration 
To get Ether on Metamask accounts, a transaction can be created from Geth JS con-
sole by using command: 
• Eth.sendTransaction({from:sender_address, to:receiver_address, value: 
web3.toWei(amount, “ether”)}) 
 
Another way to get Ether on Metamask account is to allocate Ether to it in the gene-
sis block file. Metamask account can also be used as a coinbase account and Ether re-
warded from mining will go directly to Metamask by using following command in 
Geth JS console: 
• miner.setEtherbase(“account_address”) 
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Appendix 3.  Installation manual for blockchain monitoring 
#Prerequisites 
Eth-net-intelligence-api and eth-netstats both require following software to be in-
stalled: 
• Git 
• Curl 
• NodeJS 
 
NodeJS requires Curl to be installed on the machine, you can install NodeJS using fol-
lowing commands: 
• sudo curl -sL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_13.x | sudo -E bash –  
• sudo apt-get install -y nodejs 
 
# Installing eth-net-intelligence api 
Now that node is installed, the PM2 which is used to run the eth-net-intelligence-api 
can be installed and the repository for eth-net-intelligence-api can be downloaded 
using following commands: 
• sudo npm install -g pm2 
• sudo git clone https://github.com/ethereum/eth-net-intelligence-api 
 
Configuration file “app.json” is found in the eth-net-intelligence-api directory. In the 
configuration file params “name”, “INSTANCE_NAME”, “WS_SERVER” and the 
“WS_SECRET” need to be configured before using. (See Figure 16.) Parameters 
“name” and “INSTANCE_NAME” are identifiers used for the monitoring. 
“WS_SERVER” needs to point to eth-netstats server. If running in localhost “lo-
calhost:3000” works, but if hosted to a network, then an address needs to be given. 
“WS_SECRET” is a password used for allowing eth-netstats to connect to eth-net-in-
telligence-api. 
Each machine joining the monitoring needs its own configuration file, but in the 
nodes connecting to the monitoring node the “RPC_HOST” needs to be the IP-
address of the node joining the monitoring. 
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Figure 16 app.json configuration file 
After configurations have been set, the eth-net-intelligence-api can be started by us-
ing command: 
• sudo pm2 start app.json 
 
If other machines are used in the monitoring, then every configuration file must be 
included in the starting command: 
• sudo pm2 start app.json app1.json app2.json 
   
#Installing eth-netstats 
For eth-netstats Grunt is installed and it is used for building the resources for the 
monitor interface. Installing eth-netstats and Grunt is done by using following com-
mands: 
• sudo git clone https://github.com/cubedro/eth-netstats 
• cd eth-netstats 
• sudo npm install 
• sudo npm install -g grunt-cli 
• Grunt 
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To start the eth-netstats the “WS_SECRET” set in the eth-net-intelligence api is used 
in the starting command: 
• Sudo WS_SECRET=password npm start 
 
After executing start command, the monitor is accessible from the browser at the set 
address. (See Figure 6.) 
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Appendix 4.  Joining the blockchain 
On the nodes joining the blockchain an exact copy of the genesis block have to be ini-
tialized and in the starting command of Geth “id” has to match the blockchain net-
work id and the “rpc_addr” needs to be set to IP-address of the joining node. After 
the blockchain is started from the joining node, the node must be added as a peer in 
the node that is being joined to. To add peers, an enode address is required. Enode 
address of the node can be found from the Geth JS console by using command: 
• admin.nodeInfo 
 
In the end of the enode address is an IP-address and port. The IP address needs to 
match with the IP-address of the joining node. 
After the IP address at the end of the enode address correctly, the peer can be added 
by using command: 
• admin.addPeer(“enodeaddress@IP:port”) 
 
If peer is added successfully the console should return “true” and to verify that peer 
has been successfully added peers can be viewed with a command: 
• admin.peers 
 
After the node joins the blockchain it starts syncing blocks, this can take some time 
anywhere from seconds to tens of minutes, depending on the size of the blockchain. 
To check that syncing is done, on both machines the highest block can be seen with 
command: 
• eth.blockNumber 
 
If the returned number match, then the syncing is completed, and mining can be 
done from the peer and the block number will go up on both machines. 
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Appendix 5.  Installation manual for Remix-IDE 
Remix-IDE requires older version of NodeJS and the version 13.x does not work. Ver-
sion 10.x needs to be used. To see how to install NodeJS, See Appendix 3. Deploying 
smart contracts require an unlocked account and “—allow-insecure-unlock” needs to 
be included in the Geth starting command to be able to unlock accounts. In addition 
to NodeJS, Remix-IDE requires installation of: 
• build-essential 
• node-gyp 
• apache2 
 
These can be installed with commands: 
• sudo apt-get install -y build-essential 
• sudo npm install -g node-gyp 
• sudo apt-get install apache2 
 
Remix-IDE can be installed with command: 
• sudo npm install -g remix-ide –unsafe-perm=true –allow-root 
 
Remix-IDE is started by using command: 
• remix-ide 
 
Remix-IDE starts, and it can be accessed from the browser by going to the address, 
which can be seen in the console after Remix-IDE has been started. 
To start using the Remix-IDE an environment needs to be chosen. Solidity is the main 
environment for smart contracts, and it needs to be chosen in the starting page. 
After the environment is chosen, the Remix-IDE needs to connect to the blockchain, 
which can be done from Deploy & Run Transactions section. (See Figure 17.) Choos-
ing Web3 provider enables the connecting to a private blockchain. After connecting 
Remix-IDE to the private blockchain, a smart contracts can be deployed.  
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Figure 17 Choosing the blockchain environment 
Smart contracts can be developed in the file explorers section by creating a new file 
with .sol file extension. After contract is written it needs to be compiled in the Solid-
ity compiler section. After compiler has finished compiling the contract, a green 
check mark will appear on the icon of Solidity compiler. 
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Deploy & run transactions section is used for deploying smart contracts. To deploy a 
smart contract an account must be selected, because deploying a smart contract re-
quires an account to pay for the gas fees, as the smart contract is a transaction. Ac-
count used for the smart contract deployment needs to be unlocked from Geth JS 
console using command: 
• personal.unlockAccount(eth.accounts[x], “password”) 
 
After account is unlocked the smart contract can be deployed. After a block is mined 
where the smart contract is included, it will be shown in the deployed contracts sec-
tion. By pressing “Render” anything returned from the smart contract can be seen. 
(See Figure 7.) 
